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6. Empty Threats? How Egyptians’ Self-Ontology Should
Affect the Way We Read Many Texts
Kerry Muhlestein

Abstract
Egyptologists have typically divided texts into those that dealt with the divine and those that
treated the mundane. This false dichotomy is not one that the Egyptians themselves would have
imposed. They saw themselves as mortal beings that interacted with the divine realm and the
afterlife. The texts they created reflect this understanding, and thus we are greatly hampered when
we insist that the language of a decree, threat formula, or other texts, must refer to either the
mundane or the supernatural, but not both. There is ample evidence that the Egyptians often
intended specific wording to invoke multiple realms, by use of metaphoric and divine language, and
by doing so they increased the efficacy of their texts. Without this understanding, we will
misunderstand many of the texts we study.
Key words
Threat-formulae, divine language, textual interpretation, charms, inscriptions

I aver that in our own lives most Academicians, whether religious or not, make divisions
between the natural and supernatural, compartmentalizing the mundane and ultramundane.1 We do
this as Enlightenment-influenced creatures who habitually and consciously – often even
unconsciously – bifurcate the religious and the secular. The Academy, almost regardless of
geographic location, usually strengthens this Western tendency. While this training is invaluable
as we form our methodologies, it concurrently creates a world-view barrier between us and those
of ancient or modern cultures who do not create such mental dichotomies. Because we operate in
light of our own experience,2 we tend to superimpose this Western compartmentalization on the
ancient Egyptians. However, this contravenes the world view that the Egyptians themselves
possessed. The other-worldly, or preternatural, was superjacent in all aspects of Egyptian life. We
understand this when the Egyptians employ language in the form of simile, explicitly comparing
themselves to the divine, such as when the king “appeared against them like Montu.”3 Recognizing
Egyptian self-identification with the preternatural becomes more difficult when the similes give way
to other rhetorical devices in which the comparison or self-identification is less transparent. I call
this divine language, such as when the king “is the strong bull, sharp of horns and resolute;”4 or
when the king destroys enemies with “his flame.”5 Differences between these terms will be
discussed below, but from the outset we must understand that supernatural similes and divine
language were not employed merely as literary devices; instead they reflect the Egyptian tendency
to see themselves in light of both the mortal and supra-mortal realms. They lived in their metaphor,
considering themselves ontologically to have a presence simultaneously in what we would consider
to be a number of different planes; such a multivalent self-view is commonly reflected in Egyptian
texts. Failure to realize this hampers us in our efforts to understand many such texts.
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There can be no doubt that the ancient Egyptians considered themselves entities with
elements of existence in a number of spheres. They were not a conglomeration of flesh and bones
that existed for the few moments of mortality and then ceased to exist, creating minimal
ramifications upon others and the cosmos. Instead they were beings that existed in a mortal realm,
interacting with the divine sphere, and moving on to an afterlife which was at least partially
integrated with the divine, but which also continued to collude with the mortal realm. Moreover,
their actions in any of these spheres could have cosmic influence.
While this multivalent impact must have, to some degree, weighed heavily on the Egyptians
themselves, their response to such an existence also proves bedeviling for Egyptologists.
Philological evidence regarding the multivalence of Egyptian personalities is inherently skewed.
Naturally those actions which could have effect in multiple realms would be deemed of enough
import that the likelihood of its being recorded increased greatly. In a cycle of increasing
importance, the creation of the written record dealing with such events invoked the numinous power
of writing; the writing itself lifted the level of force which the events could have, creating perpetuity
and enhanced multivalence.
Even more bewildering is the tendency for these records to be intentionally ambiguous,
employing language that could simultaneously have impact in more than one sphere. This multileveled language often leaves the modern philologist in a quandary as to how to interpret the
wording encountered. Is the language speaking of something a mortal man will do, or of events
belonging to other realms? The question itself reveals that our conundrum is increased when we
operate under the false dichotomy that inscriptional language must refer to either one realm or
another.6
This compartmentalization is not one that the Egyptians themselves employed. When we
label a text as having to do with either the mortal or supra-mortal realm, we make the assumption
that texts must have been intended for only one realm at a time. This assumption also leads to
presumptions about the juridical efficacy of certain texts and their agents of enforcement. We will
find ourselves understanding the ancient Egyptians much better if we abandon such anachronistic
divisions and look for intentional polyvalence. This will also better enable us to evaluate individual
inscriptions. More levels of understanding unfold when we let the Egyptians speak in the manner
they conceived, looking specifically for the tendency to preternaturalize and multiply the spheres
of ramification. Approaching Egyptian texts with a lens that allows for the Egyptian conception of
multivalent entities operating in various spheres will enhance our understanding of what the
Egyptians themselves understood the texts to mean.
Undoubtedly the degree and type of multi-spherical references changed over the course of
Egypt’s long and splendored history. Future studies must undertake a careful analysis of the types
of references made in each time period, accounting for the medium on which the texts were created
and the social and archaeological context for each text. For example, as concepts of what was
sacred and the appropriate way to interact with the sacred changed,7 surely the method of identifying
with the sacred must have been influenced. Similarly, changing views as to the relation between
mortals and the divine8 had to impact the way in which the Egyptians sacralized their lives. Much
can be gained from examining the current topic historically, searching for continuity and change.
However, we must first more carefully address the core issues. I aver that while the specifics of
doing so probably changed over time, the habit of creating texts intended to concurrently address
more than one realm was present in all ages of Egyptian society.
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As a discipline, we have intuitively seen this multivalence in the acts of kings, rites and
spells. We have had more difficulty when looking at proscriptions, juridical expressions, and tomb
threats. These are issues that have appeared sporadically in the research of myself and others when
discussing tomb threats, spells, etc.; however, I believe that pulling together these separate threads
in a concentrated examination will be productive and useful.
Preternaturalization
There can be no dispute about the ancient Egyptian tendency to equate mortal circumstances
with preternatural characters and events. The textual reflections of this are manifested in at least
three ways. The most recognizable is through the employment of simile. For example, Senusret III
was said to “shoot arrows as does Sakhmet.”9 A string of similes is employed to liken the military
exploits of Thutmosis III to the preternatural, such as his being like Amun, stars, a bull, a crocodile,
a lion, a divine hawk, the jackal of Upper Egypt and Horus.10 Merneptah reports that “like the
flooding of the Nile, I caused Egypt to be.”11 Ramesses II “appeared against them like Montu.”12
Moreover, he “is like Montu, [grasping] his bow, like Horus in his array, with his bow he is like
Bastet, and his arrow is like the Son of Nut;”13 and he will be “given life like Re.”14 Language about
having valor, stability, dominion, protection, life or health like Re is ubiquitous.15 The use of similes
relating the acts of mortals (especially royal mortals, we will consider others below) to the
supernatural is so common it is readily overlooked. In the case of similes we understand that the
characters and acts of other spheres have been superimposed upon the acts of mortals, and vice
versa.
A similar equation with the other-worldly was made with the use of divine language. Yet
this textual tendency is less transparent, lending itself to ambiguity regarding whether the acts
spoken of belonged to this realm, the next, or both. Examples of divine language include when
Senusret III, who used common military tactics in his campaigns, had these exploits described as
smiting “foreign countries with his crown.”16 Similarly, Merneptah “has the strength of Re,”17 and
Ramesses II is the “strong bull, sharp of horns and resolute.”18 Moreover, Thutmosis III is told in
regards to a northern campaign, that the serpent upon his brow will consume those in foreign lands,
that she would burn them with her flame, and that “she cuts off the heads (dn=s tpw) of the
Asiatics.”19 While Thutmosis’ armies certainly enacted all kinds of literal mayhem on the Asiatics,
those acts are described metaphorically as the Uraeus burning and beheading.
The use of divine language can include imagery in which the wording no longer attributes
to men phenomenal abilities or divine accouterments with such, but instead attests that these mortals
carried out acts generally only credited to the divine. In this kind of divine language, phraseology
is employed that, were the name of a mortal not included, we would associate only with deities. The
prophecy of Neferti describes Ameni with such language. The line “Libyans will fall to his flame
(nswt=f),”20 uses divine language to ascribe to the king divine abilities, such as producing a
consuming flame. This is done a few lines later in another sense: “The Uraeus at his fore pacifies
the hostile for him” (shri.ti n=f XAk-ibw).21 Both lines describe the same type of thing, but the former
arrogates the power directly to Ameni, as opposed to a divine element (such as the Uraeus) assisting
him. Both are types of divine language, but the former incident can be more confusing to modern
interpreters. Similarly, Ramesses II is referred to as “Re, born of the gods” (ra mss nTrw).22
Elsewhere he says “I am Re, Lord of heaven, who is upon the earth” (ink ra nb pt nty Hr tp tA).23
Clearly he is charged with divine attributes here, via divine language.
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As Egyptologists our academic background, with its insistence on the verifiable, generally
heightens the likelihood that we will underestimate the Egyptian proclivity for seeing the
supernatural in the mundane. We must remember that the supernatural was much more real and
immediate to the typical Egyptian than to modern Egyptologists. Even lore associated with sp tpi
and other foundational events was not something of the distant past, but were actions that had
occurred, were presently taking place, and would happen yet again in the future. These historiolae
were carried out by real characters who had a real impact on the life of Egyptians. Thus, while some
circumstances may have been desirably preternaturalized, and others less so, interacting with the
supra-mundane was inevitable and unavoidable.
We cannot know the extent to which a narrative myth concerning supernatural characters
existed in various phases of Egyptian history.24 We are also incapable of deducing with how much
of any given mythical narrative an average Egyptian would have been familiar. Yet the tendency
to preternaturalize does not depend on narrative nor full familiarity with narrative. Identification
with the supernatural had more to do with the qualities of cosmic identities and incidents than with
storyline. The cryptic allusions and citations of supernatural characters and events within the
pyramid texts demonstrate that it was qualities and powers, not stories, from which it was important
to draw, even from the earliest periods of Egyptian texts. I generally, though not completely, avoid
the use of the term “myth” in this study because of the baggage the term carries and because it is
quite possible to identify with the preternatural whether or not texts dealing with divine narrative
exist.
Preternaturalization of the Political
The use of preternatural language exceeded the reflection of a world view, and was more
than creating texts as political propaganda.25 The purpose went beyond convincing others of a
particular viewpoint. Instead it actuated that viewpoint, both by appeal to historiolae and by
enforcing the numinous power of writing in multiple realms. These texts may have convinced, but
more importantly, by means of identification with the preternatural, they created, enforced, and
empowered.
Such preternaturalization is most readily seen in the political sphere. Egyptologists
understand well that the death of the king and the ascension of his successor was viewed as an event
both quotidian and as a re-enactment of the story of Osiris and Horus. Other actions of the king
were also often identified with the divine. For example, after burning (rkH.tw) a group of Theban
rebels, Prince Osorkon identifies what he has done with bringing the eye of Re, an allusion to the
Myth of the Heavenly Cow.26 Osorkon then serves warning that any rebellion in the future would
be met with the fire (nbi) of Mut (divine language).27 Given that Osorkon himself had just burned
malefactors, we can assume that he would do so to any who acted likewise in the future; yet he
equated this punishment with divine fire. In his mind the punishment he had inflicted had taken
place multivalently on both a mundane and supra-mundane level; necessarily so, since the rebellion
against royal authority he had been dealing with clearly had cosmic ramifications.28 He also raised
any future rebellions to the same supernatural level, along with the punishment that would ensue.
Such a warning, with its obvious reference to real burning, casts illumination on other threats of
action from supernatural beings in royal decrees and elsewhere. If the threat could have real
consequences in this inscription, was it thus in others?
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We should ask, for example, what should be made of a donation stela from the time of
Shabako. The text states that any who harmed the donated fields would fall to the sword of the king
(literal), and that Sakhmet would somehow punish them (divine language), though a lacuna makes
this section so unreadable as to render it impossible to tell exactly what Sakhmet would do.29 Since
the donation had been given to a temple, and since Shabako was pictured on the stela, we may
assume that the land in question had come under state protection. It seems very unlikely that those
who harmed state property would not be punished by the state. Yet in this case, as with so many
others, the crime and punishment have been raised to the preternatural level. This does not mean
that a worldly punishment would not be enacted; instead it extended the efficacy of that punishment
to multiple realms.
Such preternaturalization happens again and again. We will highlight only a few more
examples. Those who might misappropriate the tomb personnel of Amenhotep son of Hapu are
warned that they would go “to the fire of the king on the day of his fury (literal). His Uraeus shall
spit fire on their heads (divine language), annihilating their bodies and devouring their flesh, having
become like Apophis on the morn of the New Year (simile).”30 When possible, misappropriation
of tomb personnel was punished by the state.31 Here we should note that the state’s potential
response to it has been preternaturalized.
A stela from Dakhla states that any who disregarded its inscription would be killed by
Amun-Re and Sakhmet, and was “an enemy of Osiris, lord of Abydos” (xrwy n wsir nbt AbDw).32
The enemy of Osiris is Seth; additionally, Amun-Re and Sakhmet jointly killing is reminiscent of
the narrative of Sakhmet killing rebellious mankind for Re. In this case, the inscription makes
mortals congruent with a number of elements from two specific historiolae of sp tpi. Similarly, a
hymn to Amun likens Apophis to those who rebel: “The weapon is in Apophis the injurer, felled by
his sword (divine language). Our rebels, they are cut down (literal).”33 Again, mortal rebels are
narratively identified with the other-worldly. In a ritual designed to thwart foreign incursions, Seth
and Apophis are told they can no longer enter Egypt, equating the entrance of foreigners with
preternatural characters.34 Hornung notes a Ptolemaic tomb inscription which identifies potential
violators with Apophis.35 A Ramesseum papyrus equates rebels with the son of Nut.36 Late sources
speak of red foreigners being killed to represent eradicating Seth and all the enemies of Osiris.37
Even animals could be sacralized, such as when when an oryx, goat, or other animals were
associated with Seth or Apophis,38 and thus their destruction was also preternaturalized.39 In each
of these cases a quotidian event has been transformed into something larger as it is equated with
sacral historiolae.
The fluid movement between the mortal and preternatural introduces elements of ambiguity
in the Teachings for Merikare. Here, Merikare is told “Do not strike down (m sqr), it does not
empower you. Punish with beatings, with captivity, and thus will the land be established. Except
for the rebel whose plans are discovered, for god knows those who plot treason, god smites his
obstacles in blood (divine language)” (Hwi nTr sDbw=f Hr snfw).40 Here it is expressed that god will
smite the rebel, but since it is the king who is told not to strike people down except for the rebels,
it is clearly the king who must enact the smiting of those rebels, lest he lose his throne. Similarly,
Merikare is admonished that “He who is silent toward the violent (grw r sxm-ib) diminishes the
offerings. God will attack the rebel for the sake of the temple (divine language)” (tkk nTr sbi Hr r
pr).41 Again the reference is to god attacking the rebel, but implicitly Merikare is warned that this
attack must come from him because of the danger of being silent towards violence. In both of these
cases the language is divine, but the actions refer to the king. The language does not have reference
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to the actions of two different beings, instead it lifts the actions of the king to the divine realm,
causing his attack to be efficacious in multiple spheres.
I believe we see similar ambiguity in the Hatshepsut inscriptions at Deir el-Bahri. In the
account of her coronation ceremony, it is written that Thutmosis I declared that “he who shall speak
an evil thing in the path of her majesty shall die (literal).”42 This pseudopigraphic edict is probably
due to the extenuating circumstances of Hatshepsut’s need for suppressing anything that would
detract from her legitimacy, and it is difficult to imagine that this threat would not be employed
under the aegis of the queen herself. Yet later in the inscription it is recorded “as for anyone who
will speak against the name of her majesty, immediately god shall cause his death (divine
language).”43 While the agent of the punishment has been preternaturalized by the use of divine
language, surely the royal court would see to its enactment, as intimated earlier in the inscription.
Another example of preternaturalization can be found when Ramesses II had his actions in
the battle of Qadesh described as:
On my brow my serpent was felling my foes for me, (divine language)
Casting her blast of flame in the faces of my enemies, (divine language)
I was like Re when he rises at dawn, (simile)
My rays burned the flesh of the rebels.44 (divine language)
Ramesses being like Re when he rises is in parallel with his rays burning rebels. This
hearkens to Re having those who rebelled against him killed by his eye at the beginning of a new
day. Such a preternatural identification is strengthened in the next four lines of the poem, wherein
Ramesses’ enemies describe him as Sakhmet the great. In the myth of the Heavenly Cow, it was
Sakhmet who destroyed rebellious mankind for Re. Clearly Ramesses intended to identify his
actions not only with preternatural characters, but with a specific illo tempore mythical event.
More evidence could be brought forth, but there is already a great deal of acceptance that the
political realm demonstrated a tendency to preternaturalize.45 Three things are lacking from this
general understanding. First, we have typically failed to see the connection between supernatural
references and mortal actions, such as those posed by Prince Osorkon, Ramesses II, Hatshepsut, and
others as noted above. Second, there is abundant evidence that the disposition to preternaturalize
extended beyond the political. Third, there is a general failure to apply this tendency to other types
of Egyptian texts.
The Preternaturalization of the Individual
Undoubtedly the average Egyptian often identified his own quotidian acts with those which
took place in other realms. This is most transparent in charms and spells. It has been long
understood by Egyptologists that in this genre the individual sought identification with the
supernatural, hoping to influence their own lives by choosing with which ultramundane occurrence
their circumstance would be equated. For example, a spell for warding off plagues equates the
owner with Horus, saying “I am Horus,” and further “I am your Horus, Sakhmet (divine
language).”46 Similarly, in a spell to fend off bad dreams, a man is to call on his mother Isis, who
will draw the bad dream out of him, referring to him as Horus (divine language).47 In a spell
designed to help in a conflict, the man asking for help says that Montu and Seth will strike the
antagonist, and that if this adversary were to “seize my feet, I am Montu. If you kill, I am Osiris
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(divine language).”48 Spells dealing with child birth lifted the laboring mother from the mortal realm
to the divine, regarding her as Hathor49 or Isis (divine language).50 Vaginal hemorrhages (snf) could
be equated with the inundation (Hapy) wherein Anubis was invoked to stop the flood (divine
language).51 In one spell dealing with a snake, the protagonist claims “I wield your catching-fork
as Horus” (simile).52 A variety of spells for easing a burn identify the burn victim with Horus,
asking for Isis to aid him (divine language).53 Dozens of spells dealing with scorpions identify
mortals with Horus, Isis, Re, Geb, and other deities (divine language).54 Spells could even go so
far as to sacralize inanimate objects, such as when a spell for protecting a house indicates that the
bolts of the door are actually Ptah (divine language).55 While preternatural identifications in this
genre are overt, equating mundane and real actions with divine events, what is surprising is that such
an acknowledgment is not extended to similar trends in other genres.
Threat Formulae, Ritual Texts and Decrees
Operating under the old tendency to dichotomize texts into the categories of mortal or supramortal, Egyptologists have debated the conundrum as to whether or not tomb curses were ever
meant to be acted out during mortal life,56 or if they were always intended to take effect in another
realm.57 It seems to me that these need not be mutually exclusive. It is even plausible that a double
meaning may be intended, indicating action that should take place in the here and now, but insuring
both that those actions would have effect in other realms, and that if the action did not take place
in this life, it would in the next. The fluidity of thought expressed in the threats, and their incumbent
philological difficulty is illustrated by Assmann, who first wrote that threats could have no impact
on this realm,58 but later modified his position to reflect that the Ankhtifi curse “is not, then, a curse
in the normal sense but the announcement of laws; malediction and jurisdiction intermingle in a
curious way.”59 Assmann’s earlier objections stem from what Baines identified as his tendency to
separate the divine and “real” world in a problematic way since “it could suggest that the world of
the gods is not real. For the actors that world is real, even if its status may be less straightforward
than the human world.”60
Undoubtedly there are a whole host of threats which could only be enacted by the
supernatural, such as being hated (xbd) by Re,61 being judged with the deceased by a god,62 or being
consigned to the prison of the netherworld.63 Often these types of punishments are strung together,
making it quite clear that they belong to other spheres of existence.64 Concomitantly, many threats
had to be intended to be acted out in the mortal realm. For example, Willems has pointed out that
the loss of burial and identity prescribed in threats is a well known juridical punishment.65 By the
time a person arrived at a tribunal in the next life it would be too late to deny him a burial, indicating
that the denial of burial was at least intended to be enacted by “the living.” Willems also
demonstrates that curses of death by fire mirror perfectly texts which are certainly juridical;66 Sottas
compares threats from the Old Kingdom with royal decree punitive clauses;67 Nordh notes that the
threat formulae used in execration rituals often coincided with a legal enactment of their texts;68
both Goedicke and Morschauser have outlined threat formula terminology that indicates the
pronouncement of capital punishment.69
Yet the middle ground – texts which could be taken as either intended for this life, the next,
or both – is much larger than we have previously acknowledged. I believe this is true of both threats
pronounced by individuals, and those associated with the state or king. While elsewhere I have
written about the likelihood that threats had elements which either dictated or mirrored mortal
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actions,70 my thinking about some of the elements previously discussed has shifted. Language that
we once considered quite clear has become much more ambiguous in my mind. For example, if
Prince Osorkon could literally enact the fire of Mut, and Shabako that of Sekhmet, what is to dictate
that other textual uses of these sacral figures and punishments did not have real life referents?
Should we not understand the many texts which speak of the Uraeus spitting fire to really reflect a
punishment by the king?71 Operating under the knowledge that burning was a form of capital
punishment commonly employed,72 and that burning enacted by mortals could be referred to with
divine language, why should ubiquitous phrases such as “the fire (Axt) will consume his limbs,”73
“ he will go to the flame (hh) of Sekhmet,”74 or “he will go to Osiris’ brazier (ax),”75 not be taken
literally? Could being cursed to fall to the “knives (dsw) of Horus,”76 have reference to real knives
enacted by real people? Why would not “belonging to the knife (Sad) of Amun-Ra,”77 or going “to
the knife (ds) of those who slaughter (Hnbw),”78 represent a preternaturalization of punishments that
were actually to be inflicted in mortality?
Furthermore, we must question our assumptions about references to unearthly tribunals.
Afterall, we know that the punishments enacted in the Harem Conspiracy were viewed as being
directed by the gods. In this case, several of those punished found that “the great punishment of
death (sbAyt aAy n mwt) was applied to him, which the gods said, ‘Do them to him’” (Dd nA nTrw ii
st r=f).79 Since this punishment was attributed to the gods, but enacted by mortals, we must ask
ourselves if other punishments ascribed to the divine via any number of phrases may not have
reflected that which was done by mankind. In this light, why should mention of being prosecuted
(wSb) by a tribunal in Heliopolis80 not refer to an earthly tribunal? This seems especially likely in
view of the fact that sometimes it was stipulated that it would be earthly officials who would enact
judgment.81 Why would references to being condemned by a god82 not be a way of combining a
preternatural event with an earthly tribunal? Should we not take the many references to having a
plea or case heard “in the place of litigation,” (bw nty wDa-mdw im)83 as a likely reference to a real
mortal judgment hall? This is more ambiguous when the judgment or litigation is to be done by the
Great God.84 While this may refer solely to a divine enactment, it seems even more probable that
the tribunal would be hoped for either in both the mortal and divine realm, or that a tribunal held in
the mortal realm would create a similar effect in the divine.
We can say of divine language in threat formulae (or, indeed, in almost any Egyptian text)
what John Baines said of references to the “mythical” in the Pyramid Texts: “To call them allusions
to myths is to weaken the implications of their presence in the texts, in which they enact rather than
evoke, an identification between a ritual action and a divine occurrence.”85
We find further evidence for this intentional ambiguity of language in ritual texts. For
example, in the Bremner-Rhind papyrus the description of a ritual which specifies that fire is
literally to be used, refers to this fire as “the fire which issues from the Eye of Horus,”86 or as the
“Mistress of Burning,” the flame from the “eye of Re,” flame of the “fiery one,” or Sekhmet, all of
which fires are to consume Apophis.87 The stabbing of the figures is referred to as going to “the
executioners of Sakhmet.”88 While the language of the text is highly preternatural, and very similar
to that of tomb threats and other textual proscriptions, it is made very clear from the rubrics that the
figures being assaulted were to literally be burned with a fire made by the priests, who ultimately
represent Horus, Re, and others. This multivalent language is representative of the cross-spheric
interaction which permeated the Egyptian world – especially the textual world – whether in formal
ritual or elsewhere.
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Multivalence of language seems even more apt in official spheres. When Seti I wrote that
the Ennead will judge those who strayed from the stipulations he outlined in the Kanais decree,89
he probably intended that a mortal and immortal tribunal would judge the transgressor; or perhaps
even more likely that the action taken by a mortal tribunal would have effect in the immortal realm.
In fact, in many ways the Kanais decree mirrors a similar Seti I decree from Nauri.90 The Nauri
decree is precise about which offenses demanded what punishments, and which mortal councils
would enact them. The Kanais decree echoes this, but the agents of enforcement are Osiris, Isis, and
Khonsu.91 In this case the mundane agents of the Nauri decree must have still been intended, but
they had been preternaturalized. We must attune ourselves to just such multivalent phrases which
could be understood as both invoking an action on earth and equating it with the supernatural. This
language causes the action taken in the mortal realm to have efficacy in other spheres of existence.
Such must be the case when Taharqa stipulated that he who violated a decree would go to the knife
of Ptah-Sokar and that Amun-Ra would slaughter him.92 Surely Taharqa wanted a punishment to
be pursued in this world, but the language of his inscription intentionally preternaturalized the
desired events. A congruent identification of mortal actions with the divine is seen when
Psametichus I threatens that the guilty would belong to the knife of Amun-Ra and Ptah, being
destined for the flame of Sekhmet, while his son would not be allowed to succeed him.93 Clearly
Psametichus intended for the punishment of the offender to be enacted in mortality as much as he
meant for the lack of succession to be. It is only the preternaturalization of the agents of
enforcement, who are equated with Amun-Ra, Ptah, and Sekhmet, that distracts us from this
conclusion.
My thoughts regarding the concept of not having an offering accepted by a god94 have also
evolved over time. I have long held this type of punishment to be something that could only be
enacted in the supernatural realm. I now believe that this may represent actions taken on earth that
were preternaturalized as part of the process of having effect in multiple spheres. Being excluded
from aspects of religious life was a possible real worldly punishment, and threats such as not being
allowed to participate in the festivals of Amun95 probably were meant to be enforced in the mortal
realm, with clear ramifications in the divine. As noted above, Willems has argued, and eventually
Assmann agreed, that Ankhtifi’s threats were intended for actual enactments; among these threats
were that Hemen would not accept the offender’s meat offering.96 If Willems’ supposition is
correct, at least part of the reason Hemen would not accept the offering is because the offender
would not be allowed to make an offering. It is likely, then, that this would be the ideal in countless
cases wherein a curse entailed that gods would not accept offerings such as white-bread.97 If this
hypothesis is true, it would represent the withdrawal of earthly privileges – which actions were
intended to interact with the divine – in an effort to affect the offender in multiple realms. While
we will never know if any of these inscriptions were ever enacted, the possibility changes the way
we understand the text.
It is not as important to determine which inscriptions were meant for which realm(s) –
indeed, often this is beyond our reach – as it is to realize that the language employed in many cases
is more fluid than we are accustomed to. Such a realization can open new interpretations and
understandings of both texts and historical events. Yet this realization must be accompanied by a
frank admission. While the ancient Egyptians likely understood what situations were appropriate
for preternaturalization, and what phraseology would indicate such, we have not cracked this code.
We simply do not presently have the knowledge available to develop a master key which can explain
every text in light of the preternaturalization tendency. A healthy dose of skepticism on both sides
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of the issue is in order. We must be open to the possibility of sacral metaphor in many texts, while
acknowledging that we frequently cannot make a certain determination. We will experience
difficulties in keeping our feet under us as we tread among such fluid wording.
It is probable that some curses really were intended for “when justice fails,” by which I mean
that the curse was intended to be acted out in this life, but if that failed to happen, characters and
forces of the next would have to be relied on. This is typical of the Egyptian “system of
redundancy,”98 wherein they made many provisions for those things that were important to the
afterlife in case there was a problem with any one of them. For instance, mummification was
designed to ensure a place for the ka. However, in case there was a problem with the mummified
body, a statue, or many statues, were also often provided (resources permitting), along with spells
and drawings. Likewise, while actual offerings were ideally provided for the dead, the redundancy
system included drawings of offerings, funerary spells, and offering spells for passers by to read,99
all aimed at ensuring the provision of offerings. However, I do not think that references to the
preternatural in threat formulae were only for when justice fails, but were commonly employed to
multiply the realms of inscriptional efficacy.
The fluidity of cross-realm interaction found in the threat formulae is highlighted in another
genre. A curious reversal takes place in many “divine decrees,” wherein the language of worldly
policies and procedures is adopted by those in the divine realm.100 For example, terms typical of
human decrees, such as Sat or wD, come to be used in divine decrees101 or by divine figures in
funerary literature.102 The adoption of the mundane by the supra-mundane underscores the degree
to which the Egyptians saw their realms colluding.
Inscriptional Efficacy
The reasons underlying Egypt’s tendency to textually identify themselves with the
preternatural make it likely that the language employed in most inscriptional genres intentionally
caused actions, in whatever realm they occurred, to be potent in a variety of spheres. In an
increasingly secular academe, this becomes more and more difficult to identify due to our lack of
tendency to resonate with a people who had a multi-leveled ontological view of themselves. We
cannot let this ebb of empathy with an Egyptian worldview prevent us from recognizing how they
conceived of themselves. It is specifically because they viewed their actions as potentially having
impact on multiple spheres that they invoked language which also had effect in those same spheres.
They sought to expand the effectiveness and role of writing, not to limit it.
The preternaturalization examples cited above indicate that many fugacious acts were viewed
as having supernatural parallels and ramifications. This was necessary for ontologically multivalent
beings. Crimes against tombs, temples, memorial inscriptions, and a variety of other aspects of life
simultaneously affected a person’s existence in both the mortal and supernatural realms, and were
viewed as the repetition of rebellious acts which had happened in the sacred historiolae of sp tpi,
creating cosmic consequences, and thus demanding appeals to preternatural narrative elements. The
authors of such appeals were well aware of the many layers of “reality” in which they were
attempting to be efficacious, hence they used language which is confusing to those who try to
compartmentalize the texts’ spheres of influence. Those who carried out actions, whether good or
ill, with ramifications in other realms supervened their merely mortal natures, and thus were
transmogrified into characters which demanded multivalent actions and texts. When we allow the
Egyptians to operate in all of the planes they intended, we are able to make much more sense of
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many of their inscriptions, allowing us to realize their viability and applicability in both the mortal
and extramortal realms. This is not only true of curses, but of much in the way of juridical and
political terminology. These numinous writings were designed to operate in a multivalent manner.
It was just such a perception of the numinousity of texts that caused Christians to later damage the
texts; they reacted against the perceived power and multivalence of the inscriptions.
Because of their continual interaction with many spheres, in all eras of Egyptian history we
find several mechanisms which enabled influence in multiple planes of existence. Ritual certainly
constituted one such mechanism, as well as many actions which were intended to eradicate not just
the mortal existence of a person, but their immortal elements as well (such as burning). Seeing a
collusion of the mundane and supramundane within these actions has allowed us to more fully
understand them. It has become apparent that the same must be done with texts, and that in so
doing, we will be able to more fully understand the intent of the language employed. The careful
crafting of language and phrases intended layers of interaction. The sacred power of writing and
language was yet another tool employed as the Egyptians felt their way through realms both seen
and unseen.
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